

音韻大辭書二二〇

41

日米外交關係書二卷一九三一九四一年度二八五頁
一九四〇年五月一日國務省ヨリホサル新聞發表六一註
蘭領東印度現狀二卷一九三一東京ヨリ新聞報道二卷レ
タ通信員カラ、貨物二卷二、國務長官公文声明行
東京ヨリ、新聞發表二卷一九三一修羅門、件二款ハ、松元會
十報告二卷二本ノ。二、數回同二、イギリス・日本及米
國・會ハ數次府ハ蘭領東印度現狀二卷二總合
開ハ、有二年半ナリ。各自、態度ヲ、公文發表二卷明
ラ九二七。

一九二三年六月二〇日、乙式二行公約確立。公約上一致
入此。本署。本政府ハ公約ヲ行シテ諸政府（各々）
公約ヲ署定。又テアラカト假定。一九四〇年四月十七日
和公式声明。於テ次、甲乙二種へ。

Ex 1287

蘭領印度，國內問題，干涉毛又和平的手段以外二三」；現狀；如何可以要毛之單二蘭領土？之十六全太平洋地域二於今安定，和平且已安全，根源二於毛有宦上毛于毛。

「丁巳，寧宗之歸，南領東印度，現欲了尊皇之志，
意圖公約，及表明八旗度牒，遂于元次，不過天子行
丁巳，不言丁巳。」

六一社一九四〇年五月一日國務會議示(第三卷甲六二)九三百三校

DOCUMENT NO. 220 P

Page 1

Foreign Relations of the United States-Japan 1931-1941, Vol. II, pp. 285-288
8-6B.01/22

Memorandum by the Secretary of State

(Washington,) May 16, 1940.

The Ambassador of Japan called at his own request. He did not mention the Philippine Immigration Bill, or the reported Japanese disturbances in Peru, or, expressly, the Netherlands Indies, or the status of European armed forces in China. At the beginning of the conversation I made reference to the increased state of war and chaos in other parts of the world and the terrible destructive effects of it in every way, adding that it appeared more and more as if no large country, much less a small country, was safe from some aggressive intervention by force in one way or another, and that about the only thing a nation could do was to arm to the teeth and be ready for any serious interference with its rights and interests by the use of military force or the threat of force. I said that, fortunately, as was shown today in Congress, and as was apparent all over the nation since the more recent invasions of helpless peaceful nations for purposes of their destruction, the American people have now become thoroughly awakened, aroused and alert in regard to any threatened injuries to American rights and interests, and that this was a matter of great gratification to those of us in charge of the foreign affairs of the nation.

The Ambassador then proceeded at great length to question and cross-examine me about the Netherlands West Indies, comprising Curacao and Aruba. I said that, of course, my Government and the other twenty-one American Republics would not consider for a moment any departure from their traditional policy relating to the safety of this hemisphere, and if that was what the Ambassador had in mind, I could make that statement together with the further statement that as soon as this Government learned of the fact that British and French vessels patrolling the waters near Curacao and Aruba were offering potential aid to the Netherlands Government in preventing possible sabotage and possible armed expeditions from the mainland intended to seize the governments on one or both of these possessions, such as governments are often seized in South American countries, this Government proceeded to assemble the facts as expeditiously as possible in regard to the ability of Netherlands guards and citizens in Curacao and Aruba to protect the islands and their governments from such dangers. I further stated that it was my understanding that the British and French patrols were in no sense interfering with the Netherlands government on these two islands, but were recognizing the authority of these governments during the brief temporary time deemed necessary to aid in safeguarding against the dangers already mentioned, and that they have made it clear that thereafter their patrols will not offer any guards for additional protection in connection with their continued patrol work, and hence there cannot arise the slightest question of interference with the traditional American policy relating to its own protection from possible dangers from abroad. Furthermore, the Netherlands Government would be expected to send from abroad any additional guards that may later be found to be needed. The Ambassador did not seem to be satisfied

with

with any sort of answer I made. He continued with an increasingly minute cross-examination as it were. I suddenly and emphatically interrupted him and with right inquired of him if his Government had sent him to me to ask all these detailed questions about a matter of no importance to his Government or to any other government, and if his Government had sent him to go into this almost interminable examination, I desired now to know what the motive and purpose of his Government was for doing so. I said that there would never be any friction between my Government and any other government on account of anything unlawful or unfair that my Government may do, but that it would be due to something unlawful that another government may do. I added that I had devoted most of the past seven years to efforts at understanding and peaceful relations between our two Governments.

I then picked up two or three pages of material which had come in via the news ticker from Tokyo, in which the Japanese Government is reported to be discussing every day or two some phases of the Netherlands East Indies and its supposed special rights in them. I stated that I had not intended to show him this, that it had just come to my desk as the Ambassador came in, but I remarked with emphasis that it had been thought that the Japanese Government and the Governments of the United States, Great Britain and France had each and all repeated recently their prior commitment that each was obligated to respect the status quo in the Netherlands East Indies and I had thought that settled the matter as among our four countries, since each country unequivocally pledged itself to respect the status quo, but I added that notwithstanding the efforts of many of us to maintain a thorough understanding with the Government of Japan, there was continually coming out of Tokyo additional discussions of the Netherlands East Indies as though the commitment to respect and preserve the status quo had not been made. I said that these were news reports and I myself was slow to accredit them, but that the tenor of the reports interfered with the efforts of the Ambassador and myself and others to preserve understanding and fair play and fair treatment between our two countries by causing misunderstanding and increasing hostility on the part of the people in each country. I said that I would make no complaint now about the matter if that was a part of the newspaper policy in Japan. I added finally that my Government strives for peace year in and year out and it desires at all times to avoid controversy, and, therefore, if controversy arises, the fault will not lie at the door of this Government. I said further that in our constant desire and constant effort to promote and preserve peace, both with other countries and among other countries, I hoped that this attitude of ours would not be misunderstood.

The Ambassador undertook in reply to disclaim any purpose of his Government to send him to me to enter into the long examination to which he was subjecting me when interrupted. He then repeated that his Government was entirely satisfied with the situation following the reiteration of the status quo in respect to the Netherlands Indies by each of the four governments interested, and that it had no purpose to raise any further controversy in that connection unless perchance the British or French should land troops there to protect them. I remarked that, since my / Government

with any sort of answer I made. He continued with an increasingly minute cross-examination as it were. I suddenly and emphatically interrupted him and with right inquired of him if his Government had sent him to me to ask all these detailed questions about a matter of no importance to his Government or to any other government, and if his Government had sent him to go into this almost interminable examination, I desired now to know what the motive and purpose of his Government was for doing so. I said that there would never be any friction between my Government and any other government on account of anything unlawful or unfair that my Government may do, but that it would be due to something unlawful that another government may do. I added that I had devoted most of the past seven years to efforts at understanding and peaceful relations between our two Governments.

I then picked up two or three pages of material which had come in via the news ticker from Tokyo, in which the Japanese Government is reported to be discussing every day or two some phases of the Netherlands East Indies and its supposed special rights in them. I stated that I had not intended to show him this, that it had just come to my desk as the Ambassador came in, but I remarked with emphasis that it had been thought that the Japanese Government and the Governments of the United States, Great Britain and France had each and all repeated recently their prior commitment that each was obligated to respect the status quo in the Netherlands East Indies and I had thought that settled the matter as among our four countries, since each country unequivocally pledged itself to respect the status quo, but I added that notwithstanding the efforts of many of us to maintain a thorough understanding with the Government of Japan, there was continually coming out of Tokyo additional discussions of the Netherlands East Indies as though the commitment to respect and preserve the status quo had not been made. I said that these were news reports and I myself was slow to accredit them, but that the tenor of the reports interfered with the efforts of the Ambassador and myself and others to preserve understanding and fair play and fair treatment between our two countries by causing misunderstanding and increasing hostility on the part of the people in each country. I said that I would make no complaint now about the matter if that was a part of the newspaper policy in Japan. I added finally that my Government strives for peace year in and year out and it desires at all times to avoid controversy, and, therefore, if controversy arises, the fault will not lie at the door of this Government. I said further that in our constant desire and constant effort to promote and preserve peace, both with other countries and among other countries, I hoped that this attitude of ours would not be misunderstood.

The Ambassador undertook in reply to disclaim any purpose of his Government to send him to me to enter into the long examination to which he was subjecting me when interrupted. He then repeated that his Government was entirely satisfied with the situation following the reiteration of the status quo in respect to the Netherlands Indies by each of the four governments interested, and that it had no purpose to raise any further controversy in that connection unless perchance the British or French should land troops there to protect them. I remarked that, since my / Government

Government was interested, I had made inquiries of the British and the French, and gathered the unequivocal understanding that they had no idea whatever to intervene in the Netherlands East Indies in any way.

The Ambassador then made some reference to the Monroe Doctrine in connection with the East Indies situation, and I replied that I had seemingly in vain sought to point out to his Government that, under the Monroe Doctrine, his country's merchant ships have equal access to every harbor in the Western Hemisphere (not including a special arrangement between the United States and Cuba), while under the policy which his Government is seeking to impose in the Pacific Ocean area, the United States and other countries are to be denied equality of trade and industrial opportunity in every Chinese port, and yet his Government seems to look with complacency on this conflicting situation.

I again brought to his attention the information contained in the news ticker report today from Tokyo, in which Japanese newspapers, as stated, were undertaking to keep alive and emphasize some supposed special interests of Japan in the Netherlands East Indies. I said it seemed very surprising to observe that, after the Japanese Government had undertaken to spread itself out over the huge republic of China, there was an intimation in the news reports that it would not be content unless it extended itself three thousand miles beyond to modestly take in the great archipelago comprising the East Indies, presumably with a view of shutting out all equality of trade opportunities among nations, while Japan would continue to demand equality of trade opportunities in every other part of the world; that there did not exist any selfish or other reason on the part of other nations to interfere in the least with equality of trade opportunities on the part of Japan. The Ambassador again stated that his Government was satisfied about the Netherlands East Indies situation in the light of the renewed promises of each of the three other governments interested, and that they had no plans or purposes to proceed there to contact the Netherlands East Indies. I expressed my satisfaction with his statement, but again reminded him of my difficulty to understand the policy of the Japanese Government or the Japanese press, whichever it was, to continue various lines of discussion indicating a claim to some sort of special interest of Japan in the Netherlands East Indies situation; that in a recent statement, I had set forth rather comprehensively and succinctly the position of this Government that the status quo should be respected and preserved by each of the four governments; that the real question presented actually related to the entire Pacific area and that no further elaboration beyond my recent statement on this subject would appear to add to anything I then said.

I still interpret the Ambassador's visit as one under instructions to develop a pretext to support Japan in connection with its plans and purposes toward the Netherlands East Indies.

C(ORDELL) H(ULL)

Doc. 220

Ex. 288

文書第二〇、P号

米國・外交關係 | 日本第五回一九三一年一九四一年

二八五頁 | 二八六頁 八五六年。〇/二

米國外務長官賀見書

一九四〇年五月十六日(華府)

日本大使ハ自ラ申シ出テ來訪シタ。アリッゼノ移
民法案、既報、ベル及ビ特ニ蘭印ニ於ケル反
日騒擾又ハ駐支敵軍、狀能ニ就イテハ大使ハ何ラ
語ラナカッタ。会談、初ニ於イテ私ハ世界、他地方
ニ於イテ戰爭狀能ト混亂が増大シ、アルユル方面ニ
ソ、恐ルベキ破壞的影響が現ハシテキル事ニ言及
シ更ニ續ケテ大國ハ言フニ及バズ小國マテモガ何ラカ
ノ武力的方法ニ依ル侵略的干涉ヲ免レバ故ニ各國
ハ出來ル大益數ヲ國人テ自國、權利及權益が
武力又ハ武力、威嚇ニヨツテ干涉ヲ受ケ又様準
備ヲ整ヘル他ハ才カ如キ狀能ニ立至シ多様ニ思
ハルト述ベタ、私ハ更ニ語リ、幸ヒ本日國會ニ於
イテ示サレタ様ニ又平和ナ弱小國ヲ破壞セントス
ル侵略が最近行ハシテ以來全世界ニ那ラカニ
ナシタ様ニ今日米國民ハ自國、權利及權益ヲ
嘴カサレル事ニ就イテ非常ニ自覺メテ油断ナ
ク警戒スル様ニナツテ居ルがコレハ米國外長ノ
任ニ當ツテ居ル我々ニ取ツテ、非常ニ満足スベキ
事ニアルト述ベタ

Doc.220P

2

次イテ大使ハ「グラカオ」及ビ「アルバ」を包含スル
蘭領西印度ニ関シ長時間ニ亘ツテ私ニ質問
及ビ反対訊問ヲ試ミタ。私ハ次ギノ如ク答
ヘタ。勿論我政府及ビ他、ニナ、アメリカノ共
和國ハ此半球ノ安全ニ関スル各國ノ傳統的政策
ヨリ聊カモ離反スル考ヘハナク、若シ大使、念
頭ニテル事がコノ桌デアルナラ私ハ今述ベタ事ニ
加ヘ更ニ次ギノ如ク言明スル事が出来ル、即チ「ク
ラカオ」及ビ「アルバ」近海ヲ警戒中ノ英佛艦隊
ハ「オランダ」政府ニ事アル場合、援助ヲ約シ
様ニコレラノ領土ノ一方カ或ハ両方ヲ篡奪ス
ル企図ノ許ニモ大陸カラ妨害ヤ遠征
軍が來ナイヨウニ防禦シテキルトイフ事実
ヲ知ルヤ否ヤ我政府ハカナル危険カラレ
ラノ島々及其ノ政府ヲ保護スルタメニ「オ
ランダ」守備隊及「グラカオ」「アルバ」兩島
民ニドレ程ノ力アルカニ関シテ出來ル丈迅
速ニ事實ノ調査收拾ニ着手シタ、アルト

Doc.2207

次イテ大使ハ、グラカオ及ビ「アルバ」ヲ包含スル
蘭領西印度ニ關シ長時間ニ亘フテ私ニ質問
及ビ反対訊問ヲ試ミタ。私ハ次ギ、如ク答
ヘタ。勿論我政府及ビ他ノニ、アメリカノ共
和國ハ此半球、安全ニ關スル各國、傳統的政策
ヨリ聊カモ離反スル考ヘナク、若シ大使、念
頭ニアル事がコノ矣テアルヲ私ハ今述べタ事ニ
加ヘ更ニ次ギノ如ク言明スル事が出來ル。即チ「
グラカオ」及セ「アルバ」近海ヲ敵戒中、英佛艦隊
ハ、オランダノ政府ニ事アル場合、援助ヲ^{シテ}シ
南米諸國ニオイテ屢々政權が篡奪サレル
様ニコレラノ領土、一方カ或ハ両方ヲ篡奪ス
ル企圖、許ニ万ニモ大陸カラ妨害ヤ遠征
軍、ガ來ナイヨウニ防衛シテキルトイフ事実
ヲ知ルヤ否ヤ我政府ハカゝル危険カラニ
ラノ鳥々及^シ其、政府ヲ保護スルタメニオ
ランクニ守備隊及^シグラカオ、アルバ両島
ニドレ程、國力^ハアルカニ關シテ出來ル大迅
速ニ事実、調査收給ニ着手シテアルト

Dec 220P

私考へ依る、英佛両海艦隊ハシラ、島二脚二丁
決議オラン、政府ニ干渉シテハ、先述如キ危
險ヨリ半山爲援助、必要上且ハ短期間ニ於シラ、
政府、權威ヲ認メテキタ、アリ又今後彼等、両海作業が
連續スル場合ハ保護ヲ強化スル爲ニ両海艦隊ハ増加スル
分如キ事、ナシ旨ヲ明カシタ、シ故外部、危険ニ付スル自
己防衛觸入米國、傳統的政策ニ干渉トノ問題起
余地ナシ更ニガラバ、政府ハ後日専要ナリ思危守
備矣ヲ送此事モ予期セラレ大便、私ト、返答ニ満足
ナシ更ニ該久ト細部、一旦ア質問シ反対訊向モ云々キモヲ試
ミ。

私ハ突然強々彼ヲ遮テ甚シ貴方、政府、自今又
他、ハ政府ニ付等重要性ナ事柄ニ就キカカル詳細ア
質問ラサセラ爲ニ貴方ヲ私、許ヨコシタ、アリカヲ當然
事トシテ尋ネ若シ貴方、政府ガカカル殆ド果シナ
質問ラスル爲ニ貴方ヲ寄越シトスルト一体ドニ勤
機ト目的、シカシ、カ知リト尋ヌ。

我政府が何々不法、或々不当事、ナシ本カシ、我政府
ハ他、政府トノ間ニ不和が起シテハ事ハ決シテアリ得
、若シカカル事が起シテバ、ハ他、政府が何々不法
事ラスル場合テアルト述ベタ更ニ言葉ヲ續ケ、自
今ハ兩政府間ニ了解及平和的關係ハ、努力、爲
過去大半間、大部分ヲ達シタ、アルト附言シタ。

Doc-220-P

次ギニ私ハ即ち電信機ニ依リ東京カラ來ノ材料
ニ三頁ヲ取上ケタソレニハ日本政府ハ毎日或ハ隔日ニ
蘭領東印度、或局面又彼等ガソニ於ニ有スルト
自在ニテ平ル権益ニ就キテ論シキルト報シキル
私ハコレ別ニ彼ニ示スワモリハ無カツタガ彼か丁度室
ニ入フテ未タ時、机ノ上ニ置カシバカリテアツク、ズト話
シテ然ニテ日本政府及心米英佛各政府ハ各ニ最近
各國ハ蘭領東印度、現狀維持ヲ尊ニベナ義
務アリト、ノ以前、公約ヲ締述シト、記ナラテアフ
各國ハ明瞭ニ、現狀維持尊ニ重テ誓約シテ故以
上、事ニヨリコト問題ハ四國向ニ於ニ解決ヲ見テミ、
自分テ考ヘニキタ旨ヲ強調シテ然シ更ニ續ケテ我ノ、中
テノ、考ガ日本政府ト十分ナル了解ヲ保ナウト努力
シテニモ均ラズアカモ現狀維持尊ニ重保持、誓約
ガナレカラタ様ニ、東京カラハ引續キテ蘭領東印度
ニ關スル論議が齋サレルト述べテ

コレハ新聞報道アリ私自身直ナシレテ言スルモ
ノテハナクガ報道、論調ハ兩國國民向ニ誤解ヲ生
ベシメ敵愾心ヲ増大シ兩國向ニ理解ト公平ト行
動ト公平ト取扱ヲ保テウトスル一大便ト私及ビ他
人々努力ヲ妨害スルモノアルト言フク

220P

私ハ若シリシガ日本ニオレル將軍政黨一部ヲナラ
今リ、ヨリテ署議ヲ據ムモナハ十ト云シタ。

亦既ニ私ハ我政府ハ終始平和、爲ニ努力シ、常ニ諭等
ヲ避ケント者、汝ニテ居シが故ニ、若シ諭等が起ナラ
ソ、吾ハ我が政府ハ十トアクト附言シタ。

更ニ賣イテ他國ト、間並ニ他國皆ニオレル平和ヲ促
進シ且保持セントスル我、恒久的大希望及努力
ヨリ言ツテ斯、如キ我々、態度ニヨリテ誤解ナカラ
コトア希望添スト言矣ヲ加ヘタ。

大使ハ答ヘテ日本政府ハ別ニ特別ナ目的ヲ以テ彼ヲ私
シ派遣シテ先般私ニ遮ガラシテキタ時丁度仕掛
ケテキタ長ノ訊問ヲサセタ認テハナイト否定シタ。

次イテ彼、日本政府ハ關係四ヶ國、各々ガ蘭領印及ニツ
ク、現狀ヲ維持スルトイコトア繰返シテ以來、狀態ニ
全ク満足シテ居リ、且英佛兩國政府ガ蘭印保護、クノ
軍隊ヲ上陸セシメナリ限リ、ソニキニ關シテハコトニ、諭等ヲ
起ス何ラ、意圖ニ有スルセ、テハナイト繰返シタ。

5
私ハ我政府ハコトニ關心ニ有スルが故ニ、自分ニ英佛兩國
政府同合セ、彼ヲハ如何ナル方法ニテモ蘭領東印及
干渉不参考ハ全然ナリト、イフコトヲハ解ニ了解シタ
旨ヲ述ベタ。

次イテ大使ハ西印紙、情勢ニヨリモロ、主義ニ言及
シタ。ソニテ私ハ答ヘテ、モロ、主義、下テハ日本、商
船、西半球、合衆國ト、ギハ、向、特別協定ヲ除エ

220P

凡て、港、軍等は從沙ア博ヒニ及フ、日本政府が水平溝
地域ニ於ケテ抑シ付ケヨリテアキル政黨ニヨルト、合衆
國反リ、他、國々ハ中國、香港ニ於ケテ、通商工業業ニ、
機会、平均等々拒絶セラリテナリが、彼、政府ハコト予會
スル旨、極勢ヲ満足テ認メテナリヤウニ思ハレルトトナリ
ヲ、彼、政府ニ指摘セントラタク、其歎ラシク思ハレルトトナリ
ヘタ、再び和ハ大使ニ向ヒ、今日東京カラ來タ印宣電
信機報告ニ依レバ、日本朝支ニ日本が南印東印支ニ
或ル特殊ノ権益ヲ有シテナリト、自任シテナリニニ就キテ
無邊シ吉慶ケテ強調シテナリト、本ニ有志ア促シテ。

(次、續)

私、更ニ述ベリ。知リテ非常ニ警覺シ。日本政府ハ及大ナ中華民國ニ抗張シテ手始メテ後、競争見ル。日本、世界、他、イニスレ、方面ニオニテ通商機會均等ニ要求ニ續ケテ、半ニテ他國通商機會均等ヲ拒絶セントル為ニテ、ガ三千哩ニ近ビテ東印度、構成一大群島ヲ密ニ集取、不満足シトイニテ、事オホシカサレテコルトナリス。他、諸國ガ日本側通商機會均等ニ全然干渉シテイハ、ハフシテ國ニ何等ノ利己的又、他ノ理由ケテイカラダアルト

大使ハ再び述ベテ、日本政府ハ、關係アル他三国政府が、再び新シノ約東洋事、鑑ニ蘭領東印度、狀態ニ満足シテ居リ又現地ニ赴、蘭領東印度ト折衝、不穏ナ計、畫目的モナヒ旨ヲ言明シル。彼ノ言明ニ満足シテ、ヨツニキガ再び彼ニ告ゲテ、自分ヘドウシニ日本政府ノ政策カ又ヘ日本ノ新聞ノ政策カドナラカ解ラヌ。日本、蘭領東印度ノ場合ニ、或心種ノ特殊権益ヲ有スルトノ主張ヲ繙、述ニテ、色々論ジテ、平ルノハ了解ニ吉シムヤナリ。又最近ノ声明ニオナ、四國政府ハ、現状維持ヲ尊重シ、維持セバナラヌトイフ。我政府、態度ヲ廣幅、圓ニ且、簡勁ニ述ベタリ。及ビ提出フレタ、實際問題ハ、全不平洋域ニ蘭花ヲテアリ。問題ニ就イテ、私ノ最近ノ声明、以上ニ繙ケコレテ、述ベテヨニ何ヲ別ニ加ヘンソモリハナイト。語ツク。然大使ノ訪問、蘭領東印度ニ對スル日本ノ計畫及目的ニ、因シテ日本ヲ支持スル為、口實ヲ述ベシメントノ訓、合シ、許ニサレタモノト今尚解釈矣。

(一) (ニテル ハル)

WIRELESS NO. 320 /V\

Page I

FOREIGN RELATIONS of the United States-Japan, 1931-1941
 762.94/484: Telegram
 The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State

(Paraphrase - Extracts)

Moscow, March 24, 1941--3 p.m.
 (Received March 25--7.30 a.m. 12)

581. This morning I was given the opportunity by invitation of the Japanese Ambassador, to talk with Matsuoka ¹³ for an hour.

Matsuoka was emphatic in stating that under no circumstances would Japan attack Singapore or any of the American, British, or Dutch possessions, and he was insistent that Japan has no territorial ambitions. Japan, he said, was ready at any moment to join the United States in a guarantee of the territorial integrity or independence of the Philippine Islands. As an evidence of Japan's lack of territorial ambitions, Matsuoka referred to the outcome of his mediation of the dispute between Thailand and French Indochina. He said that Japan would not go to war with the United States, and added that from his reading of American history it appeared that it was the United States which went to war with other countries; if a conflict should take place it would come about only as the result of affirmative action by the United States.

Matsuoka said that he desired ardently to liquidate the war in China at the earliest possible date. Chiang Kai-shek was relying upon American help, he said, and any time the President of the United States wanted to bring the Sino-Japanese conflict to an end on terms satisfactory to all concerned, he was in a position to do it by bringing his influence to bear in this direction upon Chiang Kai-shek.

I asked him whether he had in mind terms which he was sure Chiang Kai-shek would be entirely willing to accept and which would meet with the President's approval. He replied that instructions had recently been sent to Nomura ¹⁴ to take the subject up with the President and to discuss with the latter the terms on which the Sino-Japanese war could be terminated. Matsuoka said that now was the time when statesmen should take decisive action and that it is the "big things, not the little things" that matter; in his opinion the President is afforded a splendid opportunity "to clear up the entire Far Eastern situation" by discussing with Nomura the terms on which the war in China could be brought to a close. He added that he wished the President and the Secretary of State would trust him; on his record over the past few years, he said, he did not blame them for not having confidence in him, but that if they would give him the opportunity he would prove to them that Japan had no territorial or economic ambition, and that if an understanding were reached regarded by us all as reasonable he would fight to put it through should any elements in Japan oppose it.

12 Telegram in three sections.

13 Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, on special mission to the Soviet Union.

14 Japanese Ambassador in the United States.

/ In

In reply to what he had first said, I merely suggested to Matsuoka that he instruct Nomura most explicitly as to exactly what was in his mind as a basis for ending the war with China, and that he leave nothing open either to chance or to misunderstanding. Again he was emphatic at this point in insisting on the acceptability of the terms which he had in mind.

Matsuoka characterized as "ridiculous" any fears which were expressed in the United States over interference with supplies of rubber and tin, as these commodities were obviously for consumption in the only market that was large enough to absorb them; namely, the United States. It would be folly, he said, to interfere with the export of these commodities to the United States.

He expressed the opinion that it was to the Soviet Union's interest to encourage war between Japan and the United States, and he said that he was well aware of the harm to Japan which would follow from any such conflict.

STEINHARDT

RETURN TO ROOM 361

文書第ニ二〇四

『一九三一年／昭和六年／ヨリ一九四一年／昭和
十六年／ニ至ル日米外交關係』第二卷一四三頁

一一四五頁

電報 七六二、九四／四八四

駐蘇大使（スタンハート）ヨリ

國務長官宛（駿衍一抜奉）

一九四一年（昭和十六年）三月二十四日午後三時モスコ一發信
三月二十五日午前七時三十分受信（註、三部分カラ成ル電報）

五ヘ「今朝私ハ日本大使ノ招待テ一時間ニ亘リ松岡
(註、日本外務大臣、藤聯派遣特使)ト會談スル
機會ヲ與ヘラレタ。

.....

松岡ハ如何ナル意情ガアツテセド日本、シングガボ
ール或ハ米、英、蘭ノ如何ナル領土ヲモ攻撃スル
コトヘナイト強調シ、又彼ハ日本ハ何等領土的野
心ハ持ツテキナイト主張シ述べタ。彼ハ日本ハ當
ニ比律賓諸島ノ領土ノ保全乃至獨立ヲ保障スルコ
トニ合衆國ト協力スル用意ヲ有スルト言ツタ。日
本ニ領土的野心ガナイト云フ。證左トシテ松岡ハ
泰、佛印間紛争ニ對スル彼ノ仲介ノ成果ニ言及シ
タ。彼ハ日本ハ合衆國ト競争ヲシナイト言ヒ、又

Ex1289 Doc 220M

Doc 220 M

彼ガ讀ンダ米國史ニヨルト外國トノ戰爭ヲ始メタ
ノハ合衆國デアツタトノヤウニ思ヘタ。若シ紛爭
ガ起ルトスレバ、ソレハ合衆國ノ積極的行動ノ結果ニ外
ナラナイデアロウト附加ヘタ。

松岡ハ中國ニ於ケル戰爭ヲ出來ルダケ遠カニ終結
サセルコトヲ燕望スルト言ツタ。蔣介石ハ米國ノ
援助ニ頼ツテイルカラ米國大統領ガ關係國全部ノ
滿足シ得ル條件デ日華事變ヲ終結サセルコトヲ望
ムナラバ、コノ方向ニ向ツテ彼ガ蔣介石ニ對シ其
身力ヲ用フルコトニヨツテソレヲ爲シ得ル立場ニ
在ルノダト言ツタ。

私ハ彼ニ蔣介石ガ全面的ニ承諾シ、大統領モ是認
スルト彼ガ確信シテイルヤウナ條件ヲ腹案トシテ
持ツテイルカドウカ訊ネタ。彼ハ最近野村（註、
駐米大使）ニ對シテ、コノ問題ヲ大統領ニ提起シ、
日華事變ヲ終結シ得ル條件ヲ大統領ト討議スルヨ
ウ指圖ヲ發シテアルト答ヘタ。松岡ハ今ヤ政治家
ガ決然タル行動ヲトルベキ時デアツテ、問題トナ
ルノハ「大キナ事柄デアツテ小サナ事柄デハナイ」
ト述べタ。又彼ノ意見デハ、大統領ハ日華事變ヲ
終結シ得ル條件ヲ野村ト討議スルコトニヨツテ
「極東ノ全狀勢ヲ明朗化スル」絶好ノ機會ヲ與ヘ
ラレテイルノダト述べタ。総イテ彼ハ大統領ト國
務長官ガ自分ヲ信用シテ欲シイ、過去數年間ノ自

Doc 220M

分ノ記録ニ従シテ、二人が自分ヲ信尾シオカツタ
事ヲ非難シナイ。彼等ガ機會サヘ與ヘテ吳レレバ
自分ハ日本ニ領土的乃至經濟的野望ガナイコトヲ
彼等ニ證明スル。而シテ若シ我々全部ガ合理的ト
見ル諒解ガ遂ゲラレルナラバ、日本ノ如何ナル分
子ガ反對シヨウトモ、自分ハソレヲ押通スト語ツ
タ。

最初ニ彼ガ述べタコトニ對スル答トシテ、私ハ日
奉事變終結ノ基礎トナル彼ノ考ソノモノヲ、最モ
明確ニ野村ニ指圖シテ、機會依存若クハ誤解ノ余
地ヲ残サナイヨウニサレタイト言フニ止メタ。コ
ノ點ニ於テ再ビ彼へ、自分ノ考ヘテイル條件ガ受
諾シ得ルモノデアルコトヲ強調シタ。

松岡ハゴム及錫ノ供給ガ妨害サレルノデハナイカ
ト云フ危惧ガ合衆國ニ現ハレテイルガ、コレラノ
商品ガ消化サレ得ル唯一ノ大市場、即チ合衆國ノ
消費ノタメノ商品デアルコトハ明カデアルカラ、
斯カル危惧ハ「馬鹿々々シキ事」ト言ツタ。彼ハ
コレラノ商品ノ對米輸出ニ干涉スルコトハ馬鹿ラ
シイコトダト述べタ。

。。。。。。。

彼ハ日米戰爭ヲ助長スルコトガ、蘇聯ノ利益ヲ資
ストノ意見ヲ述べタ。又彼ハ右ノ如キ衝突ノ結果
日本ガ蒙ルベキ損害ヲ自分ハ充分認識シテイルト
述べタ。

スタインハート